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READING BACK, READING BLACK
L Bennett Capers*
All of us, readers and writers, are bereft when criticism remains too
polite or too fearful to notice a disrupting darkness before its eyes.
- Toni Morrison
1
To choose an attitude toward interpretation-and therefore toward
language-these days is to choose more than just an attitude: it is to
choose a politics of reading, it is to choose an ethics of reading ....
- Alice Jardine2
I. INTRODUCTION
Allow me a critical gesture. More specifically, taking to heart the
offer to put forth an Idea, allow me to suggest a way of reading the law. I
am not suggesting a reading that is exclusivist. However, I am
suggesting a reading that reveals sites of contestation, a reading that is
oppositional. What I am suggesting is a way of reading, a reading
practice if you will, that attends to the way judicial opinions function as
cultural productions 3 that create and recreate race. In short, as the title of
* Associate Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law. B.A., Princeton
University; J.D., Columbia Law School. My thanks to Elizabeth Glazer and Seth Michael Forman,
close readers both, for their helpful comments.
1. TONI MORRISON, PLAYING IN THE DARK: WHITENESS AND THE LITERARY IMAGINATION
91 (1992).
2. Alice Jardine, Opaque Texts and Transparent Contexts: The Political Difference of Julia
Kristeva, in THE POETICS OF GENDER 96, 97 (Nancy K. Miller ed., 1986).
3. Reading black is based on at least three assumptions. First, that judicial opinions function
as cultural productions and, as such, are neither neutral nor universal. All judicial opinions are
raced. All judicial opinions are gendered. Second, that judicial opinions deploy certain discursive
strategies to mask their interests and desires. Rather, distancing is used to give the impression or
illusion of objectivity and universality. Third, judicial opinions deploy codes based on "common
knowledge." These codes simultaneously serve to legitimate and authorize such "common
knowledge" through the description and inscription of racial difference.
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this Idea makes clear, I am- suggesting a reading practice of reading
back, reading black.
For some time now literary scholars have been thinking about the
relationship between race and reading. In Race, Gender, and the Politics
of Reading, for example, Michael Awkward poses a pair of questions:
"[H]ow does blackness direct, influence, or dictate the process of
interpretation? Is there a politics of interpretation that is determined or
controlled by race in ways that can be compared to the ideologically
informed readings of, for example, feminist critics?"4 Perhaps no one
has engaged these questions with more persistence than Henry Louis
Gates, Jr., who has edited two volumes of critical essays devoted to
mapping the contours of black literary theory.5 The question of
interpretation, however, was for the most part confined to texts by black
authors. Toni Morrison corrected this shortcoming in her seminal
Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the Literary Imagination, in which
she invited readers to see the "Africanist" presence that hovers, like a
shadow, over much American literature, including the works of Poe,
Melville, Cather, and Hemingway. Edward Said, who ushered in
postcolonial theory, made a similar invitation in his Culture and
Imperialism, enjoining readers to "read the great canonical texts, and
perhaps also the entire archive of modem and pre-modem European and
American culture, with an effort to draw out, extend, give emphasis and
voice to what is silent or marginally present or ideologically
represented ... in such works."
6
Perhaps because I come to the table as a law professor, however, I
find other questions insisting themselves. If the reading of Western
literature can be enriched by examining such texts through the lens of
race, can a similar enrichment obtain from using a similar reading
practice to read the law? And what would such a reading practice entail?
Would it have its own methodology? Its own ideology? Would it be
applicable to judicial texts that are not, ostensibly, about race? What are
the implications of such a reading practice to a law that prides itself on
its neutrality, its universality? And how, exactly, would such a reading
practice enrich the study of law? Stanley Fish has argued that we each
belong to interpretive communities, and that members of these
communities are guided in their readings of texts by a common
4. Michael Awkward, Race, Gender, and the Politics of Reading, 22 BLACK AM.
LITERATURE F. 5, 5-6 (1988).
5. See BLACK LITERATURE & LITERARY THEORY (Henry Louis Gates, Jr. ed., 1990);
"RACE," WRITING, AND DIFFERENCE (Henry Louis Gates, Jr. ed., 1986).
6. EDWARD W. SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM 66 (1993).
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"consciousness," which produces interpretative "strategies [that] exist
prior to the act of reading and therefore determine the shape of what is
read .... If this is true, what does it mean for the study of law to have
a community of black readers?
The more I thought about these questions, the more I became
convinced that they are important ones, especially for those of us
concerned with making sense of this wholly racialized society in which
we live. My goal, in this brief Idea, is to convince the reader of the same.
After all, a judicial opinion is never just an opinion. As Robert Cover
has pointed out, opinions by definition have the force of law, by
definition are coercive, and by definition are violent.8 What I want to
suggest is something more: that judicial opinions function as grand
narratives, as master texts that contribute to an ideology of race and
racial hierarchy. And it shows.
Part of what motivates this project is my awareness that, to a certain
extent, I have always read judicial opinions "differently," attuned to
matters of race even in the face of efforts to excise race 9-to render race
invisible, immaterial.' 0 At least a few other scholars, particularly those
engaged in critical race scholarship, also engage in this type of reading."
But what is it exactly that we do? How is our reading practice different,
especially with respect to judicial opinions where race, though unsaid,
unseen, is nonetheless present and informing the texts? Is there a
conceptual framework that unifies this reading practice? Put differently,
what does it mean to read back, and to read black?
7. STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?: THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE
COMMUNITIES 14 (1980).
8. See Robert M. Cover, Essay, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1616-18 (1986).
9. Instances of the Court erasing race are legion. One well-known example is Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968), in which the Court gave its imprimatur to stops based solely on reasonable
suspicion. Though the defendants were in fact black, the Court made no mention of the race of the
defendants, or that the officer's explanation for why the men caught his attention was solely: "'[T]o
tell the truth, I just didn't like 'em."' See Louis Stokes, Representing John W. Terry, 72 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 727, 729-30 (1998).
10. 1 am also motivated by the knowledge that blacks have rarely if ever figured as the
intended or implied audience of any Supreme Court opinion. Even opinions that ostensibly benefit
blacks-such as Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)--seem to be written to
persuade whites. Sandford Levinson has also addressed the implied audience of Brown. See Sanford
Levinson, The Rhetoric of the Judicial Opinion, in LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN
THE LAW 187, 195-200 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996). However, Levinson does not
discuss the race of the implied audience.
11. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946,
1007-11 (2002) (reading through the lens of race Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318
(2001)); see also Paul Butler, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers: Revisited, 112 HARV. L. REV.
1876, 1917-23 (1999) (reading through the lens of race Lon L. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean
Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 616 (1949)).
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I employ the term "read back" because I find it particularly useful
as a concept. It suggests the practice of jurors asking for a "read back" of
testimony not just so that they can rehear what has already been said, but
rehear it within the context of having heard and seen all of the evidence,
armed with the tools to ascertain not only what was said, but what was
not said. Put differently, I use the term here to suggest a rereading that
reads not only contextually, but also critically, sensitive to the stated and
the unstated, the revealed and the concealed, and the meaning to be
gleaned from both.
Equally useful is the term "reading black." It suggests a reading
practice that is not only critical, but particularly attuned to the
frequencies and registers of race. Already, I need to make a few
clarifications. First, although I deploy the term "reading black," I do not
mean to suggest any racial litmus test for the reader. More specifically,
one does not have to be black to read black. Nor does being black
necessarily equip one with the skills or desire to read black. Justice
Thurgood Marshall, I believe, read black. So did Justice William
Brennan. Justice Clarence Thomas, with one or two notable
exceptions,' 2 generally does not. Second, by invoking the term "reading
black," I do not mean to privilege this form of reading over other forms
of reading, such as reading feminist, or reading classist, or reading gay.
My use of the term "reading black" owes more to Manichean
assumptions, and the fact that black continues to be the ultimate trope of
difference.
The black, after all, is still the figure in which power relationships
of master/slave, civilized/primitive, enlightened/backward, good/evil
have been embodied in the American subconscious. Because of this,
reading black has the potential to include not only attention to race, but
also to class, gender, sexuality and other hierarchical structures. As a
reading strategy, it seeks to decode the coded, to say the unsaid, and to
render visible the gaps, the fissures, and the solecisms. Reading black is
12. Two exceptions come immediately to mind. First are Justice Thomas's statements during
oral argument in Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003), which involved a First Amendment
challenge to a Virginia statute criminalizing cross-buming. See id. at 348-50. During the argument,
Justice Thomas transformed the legal debate to a personal one by describing what cross-burning
means to blacks. See Tony Mauro, Remarks by Thomas Alter Argument, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 16,
2002, at 7; see also Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Colored Speech: Cross Burnings, Espistemics, and the
Triumph of the Crits?, 93 GEO. L.J. 575, 609 (2005) (arguing that Justice Thomas "adopted a voice
of color" in Black through epistemic authority and epistemic difference). Justice Thomas also
arguably read black in his dissent in Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), which
involved a challenge to eminent domain, by pointing to the disproportionate impact the majority's
decision would have on minorities and the poor. Id. at 2686-87 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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a reading against-a reading. that is counter-discursive and counter-
hegemonic. At the same time, it is a reading with a difference,
something akin to what Gates identifies as "Signifyin(g)," or a trope of
repetition and revision.' 3 It goes beyond interpretation and the question
of what a judicial opinion means, as explored by "law as literature"
scholars such as James Boyd White,' 4 Owen Fiss,' 5 and Sanford
Levinson, 16 to ask additionally what a judicial opinion means. Finally, it
is a reading practice that requires risks, but that rewards those risks by
allowing one to see how these cases function-the work they do, and for
whom.
To illustrate this reading practice, I have chosen two cases that on
their face do not appear to be engaged in "race work" at all. In selecting
such cases, I hope to excavate the racialized thinking that informs even
those opinions most removed from racial concerns. As I shall argue,
each of these cases participates in forming racial identity and
promulgating a type of racial hierarchy. And because these are judicial
opinions, because they speak with the force of law, each of these
opinions functions as an authorizing discourse on race.
Consider The Queen v. Dudley & Stephens.' 7 In this well-known
case, Thomas Dudley and Edward Stephens were found guilty of
intentionally killing Richard Parker, a seaman "between seventeen and
eighteen years of age."' 8 It was the facts of the case that made it
sensational, capturing international attention. Rather than a crime of
passion, the case involved a crime of reason, of survival, of cannibalism.
Dudley and Stephens, together with the young Richard Parker and
another crew member, Peter Brooks, 19 were cast away at sea 1600 miles
off the coast of South Africa after their vessel, the Mignonette, capsized
during a storm. The men managed to scramble into a small open boat,
but with no water and very little food. On their eighteenth day at sea,
when they were probably still some 1000 miles from land, and some
seven days after consuming the last of their food--"two llb. tins of
turnips" taken from the ship and a small turtle caught at sea-Dudley
13. Henry Louis Gates, Jr., The Blackness of Blackness: A Critique of the Sign and the
Signifying Monkey, in BLACK LITERATURE & LITERARY THEORY, supra note 5, at 285-86.
14. See, e.g., James Boyd White, Law as Language: Reading Law and Reading Literature, 60
TEX. L. REV. 415 (1982).
15. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982).
16. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373 (1982).
17. 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884).
18. Id.
19. The fourth individual, Brooks, downplayed his role in the killing, and ultimately testified
for the prosecution.
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and Stephens "suggested that some one should be sacrificed to save the
rest.,2 0 This someone was understood to be Parker, who was already at
death's door from famine and from drinking sea water. Still, the men
waited a few days hoping a vessel would appear and rescue them. When
none appeared by the twentieth day, Dudley "offered a prayer asking
forgiveness," told Parker that "his time was come, [and] put a knife into
his throat and killed him then and there."'z The men fed on the boy for
four days, after which they were rescued.
A staple of criminal law casebooks, Dudley & Stephens often
serves as an entry point for discussing the various utilitarian and
retributive rationales for punishment. Alternatively, the case is called
upon to illustrate the interplay between offense conduct and
justifications and excuses-clearly Dudley's behavior satisfied each
element of murder, but should he and Stephens have a defense of
necessity or duress, or perhaps consent or temporary insanity? Despite
the special findings of the assizes jury that "there was no appreciable
chance of saving life except by killing some one for the others to eat,, 22
the court rejected each of their defenses-a rejection scholars have long
found problematic-and sentenced the men to death. And so ends the
case.
Or does it? After all, at the time Dudley & Stephens was decided,
cannibalism was a socially accepted practice among seamen faced with
death. As A.W. Brian Simpson put it in Cannibalism and the Common
Law:
[C]annibalism was legitimated by a custom of the sea; and the popular
literature, augmented by the unrecorded tales seamen told each other,
ensured that there was general understanding of what had to be done
on these occasions and that survivors who had followed the custom
could have a certain professional pride in a job well done; there was
nothing to hide.
23
Cannibalism even figures in Thdodore G6ricault's famous painting, The
Raft of the Medusa. Indeed, the practice was so accepted that the public,
including Brooks's older brother, rallied to the defense of Dudley and
Stephens. 24 This begs the question, or rather questions: If cannibalism
among shipwrecked seamen facing death was a socially accepted
20. Dudley & Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. at 273-74.
21. Id. at 274.
22. Id. at 275.
23. A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, CANNIBALISM AND THE COMMON LAW 144-45 (1984).
24. Id. at 76-77, 83.
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practice, why did the Crown insist on their prosection? And why did the
court reject their defenses, especially their seemingly meritorious
necessity defense, and find them guilty?
What I hope to suggest is that a re-reading of Dudley & Stephens
attuned to issues of race enhances, rather than detracts from, our
understanding of the case. What I hope to suggest is that context matters.
Consider the language used in describing the facts of the case:
[O]n July 5, 1884, the prisoners, Thomas Dudley and Edward
Stephens, with one Brooks, all able-bodied English seamen, and the
deceased also an English boy, between seventeen and eighteen years of
age, the crew of an English yacht [the Mignonette], a registered
English vessel, were cast away in a storm on the high seas 1600 miles
from the Cape of Good Hope, and were compelled to put into an open
boat belonging to the said yacht.
25
How do we read the repetition of the word "English"-"English
seamen," "an English boy," "an English yacht," "a registered English
vessel"? The easy answer would be that the court emphasizes the
Englishness of the parties and the yacht as an assertion of jurisdiction
over an incident that occurred off the coast of Africa. But this seems
unsatisfactory, especially since there is nothing in the opinion to suggest
that jurisdiction was ever in doubt. Reading Dudley & Stephens through
the lens of race not only answers some of these questions, but suggests
that the case has significance far beyond the issues of rationales for
punishment, or the limits of affirmative defenses. Read this way, the
case is not only about Dudley and Stephens, but the very quintessence of
what it means to be English at the end of the nineteenth century. And
part of what it meant to be English at the end of the nineteenth century
was not to be the "Other." After all, the image that came to mind when
one thought of cannibalism was not of civilized English sailors cast at
sea, but of the decidedly non-English, the decidedly "uncivilized." In
fact, few things were more popular than "travel writing" at the time-
think David Livingston, John Speke, Richard Burton, Henry Stanley
26
-
and the mark of most travel writing was the description of cannibalism
among the "savages," notwithstanding the fact that its practice was
extremely limited. As historians Dorothy Hammond and Alta Jablow
have noted: "[W]riters were far more addicted to tales of cannibalism
25. Dudley & Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. at 273 (emphasis added).
26. See, e.g., Patrick Brantlinger, Victorians and Africans: The Genealogy of the Myth of the
Dark Continent, in "RACE," WRITING, AND DIFFERENCE, supra note 5, at 185, 194-95.
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than ... Africans ever, were to cannibalism. '27 Indeed, nearly two
decades later, one such writer, Joseph Conrad, would place a scene of
attempted cannibalism in Heart of Darkness. In Dudley & Stephens, it
was the linkage between cannibalism and the "Other" that mattered, and
if the Other's savagery was partly evidenced by his cannibalism, this
could only mean that the British, to maintain their place on the
evolutionary ladder, could not engage in cannibalism. After all,
cannibalism was supposed to "underline[] in a most dramatic fashion
that African behavior [was] a negation of European values., 28 Faced
with common knowledge that British sailors cast away at sea were in
fact engaging in cannibalism, and presented with an actual case-the
surviving crew members functioning as a loose synecdoche for British
civilization-the court in Dudley & Stephens summarily erases this
custom and supplants it with this:
The duty, in case of shipwreck, of a captain to his crew, of the crew to
the passengers, of soldiers to women and children, . . . these duties
impose on men the moral necessity, not of the preservation, but of
sacrifice of their lives for others, from which in no country, least of all,
it is to be hoped, in England, will men ever shrink, as indeed, they
have not shrunk.
29
The emphasis is, again, on England. That is, when the crew
members were cast away off the coast of Africa, when they were adrift
in that liminal space, it was Africa that they should have kept at bay, at
least figuratively. You're Englishmen, for heaven's sake. Re-read
through the lens of race, the court's rejection of Dudley and Stephens's
seemingly meritorious necessity defense begins to make sense, however
much we may disagree with the unstated reasoning.
Similar benefits obtain from a racialized re-reading of Muller v.
Oregon,30 in which the Court addressed the constitutionality of an
Oregon statute that limited the workday of females employed in any
mechanical establishment, factory, or laundry, to ten hours a day. The
case came before the Court after the owner of a laundry required "a
female, to wit, one Mrs. E. Gotcher, to work more than ten hours" on
one day.31 Notwithstanding the fact that the Court had recently, and quite
famously, invalidated an analogous statute as a violation of the due
27. DOROTHY HAMMOND & ALTA JABLOW, THE AFRICA THAT NEVER WAS: FOUR
CENTURIES OF BRITISH WRITING ABOUT AFRICA 94 (1970).
28. Id. at 95.
29. Dudley & Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. at 287 (emphasis added).
30. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
31. Id. at 417.
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process right and liberty of individuals to contract their labor in Lochner
v. New York,32 the Muller Court found the Oregon statute constitutional
and affirmed Muller's conviction. Put differently, faced with the same
due process argument that had carried the day in Lochner, and now
faced with an equal protection argument as well, the Court found a way
to distinguish, concluding that the "difference between the sexes"
justified a different rule respecting the restriction of labor hours.
33
Not surprisingly, feminists have long read Muller as evidence of
judicial paternalism and patriarchy. A re-reading of the case through the
lens of race adds another layer to our understanding. After all, though
unstated, the Court's paternalism was clearly bounded by race. For
example, the Court relies on
reports of committees, bureaus of statistics, commissioners of hygiene,
inspectors of factories, both in this country and in Europe, to the effect
that long hours of labor are dangerous for women, primarily because of
their special physical organization.
34
The Court then posits:
That woman's physical structure and the performance of maternal
functions place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence is
obvious.... [As such], she has been looked upon in the courts as
needing especial care that her rights may be preserved.
35
However, this condescending concern makes sense-if indeed it makes
sense at all-only if one renders women of color invisible-and then
some. More importantly, one has to disregard the more than 200 years of
slavery that had ended barely a generation earlier, and that gave rise to
the very Equal Protection Clause the Court is interpreting. Assumed in
the Court's opinion is the linkage of femininity and color. Women were
white, and whiteness was associated with femininity. This was true
cross-racially-against the backdrop of slavery, how could it be
otherwise?-but it was also true intra-racially. As cultural theorist
Richard Dyer has observed: "[T]o be darker, though racially white, is to
be inferior. Gender differentiation is crossed with that of class: lower-
class women may be darker than upper-class men; to be a lady is to be as
,,36
white as it gets. Read in this manner, Muller is not only figuratively
about the fairer sex, it is also quite literally about the fairer sex, about
32. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
33. Muller, 208 U.S at 419.
34. Id. at 420 n. 1.
35. Id. at421.
36. RICHARD DYER, WHITE 57 (1997).
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white women in contradistinction to non-white women. And to make the
circle complete, white women are associated with bearers of whiteness.
After all, the Court repeatedly links the protection of women to the
rearing of offspring with a view to "the strength and vigor of the
race,"and "the well-being of the race. 37 This is what feminist Marilyn
Frye has described as the "demand that white women make white babies
to keep the race afloat., 38 Indeed, in speaking with the authority of the
law, the case is not only describing women, but inscribing them as well,
and doing so racially. It gestures toward the proper role of white women
in society, and consequently, it privileges white women over non-white
women, asking that white women carry the mantle associated with this
privilege.
And this is my point about reading back, reading black. Far from
diminishing these opinions-these grand narratives, these master texts-
reading black reveals other layers, other meanings, and in the process
deepens and widens our understanding not only of the holdings of these
opinions, but also the how and why of them.
In "Race," Writing, and Difference, Henry Louis Gates, Jr.
observes that during the period of the Enlightenment, Europeans pointed
to the absence of writing among African cultures as "proof' that
Africans were subordinate, and a fiori as "proof' that Europeans were
superordinate. 39 African Americans responded to this "knowledge"
about their inability to write by offering in rebuttal exhibit after exhibit:
books of poetry, autobiographical narratives, abolitionist tracts. As Gates
puts it:
Accused of lacking a formal and collective history, blacks published
individual histories which, taken together, were intended to narrate in
segments the larger yet fragmented history of blacks in Africa, now
dispersed throughout a cold New World. The narrated, descriptive
"eye" was put into service as a literary form to posit both the
individual "I" of the black author as well as the collective "I" of the
race. Text created author; and black authors, it was hoped, would
create, or re-create, the image of the race in European discourse.40
I reference Gates's exegesis of black writing not to discredit it, but
to gesture toward that which must have been equally important, if not
37. Muller, 208 U.S. at421,422.
38. MARILYN FRYE, On Being White: Toward a Feminist Understanding of Race and Race
Supremacy, in THE POLITICS OF REALITY: ESSAYS IN FEMINIST THEORY 110, 127 (1983).
39. Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Editor's Introduction: Writing "Race" and the Difference It
Makes, in "RACE," WRITING, AND DIFFERENCE, supra note 5, at 1, 9.
40. Id. at 11.
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more so. It was not only writing that mattered, but also reading. Of
course, to a certain extent, this was true of everyone. In colonial
America, the ability to read could allow one to escape the death penalty
under the "benefit of clergy" doctrine. 41 But it was true in a different
way for blacks. After all, one of the unifying tenets of slave codes was
that blacks should not read-must not read. This was certainly true in
South Carolina, Virginia, Georgia, and North Carolina, where
prohibitions were part of the black letter law. And it was true in other
jurisdictions as well, where the white letter law42 of custom reigned. And
yet blacks did learn to read. In fact, they risked everything to read. We
know this not from judicial opinions43-recourse to courts was rarely
needed since the power of the master was absolute44-but from the
slaves themselves, many of whom documented the risks they and others
faced in pursuit of literacy. Albert Booker, accused of "spoiling the good
niggers" by teaching them to read, was whipped to death.45 A slave
owner "hung the best slave he had" for trying to teach slaves how to
41. Essentially, a defendant found guilty of a capital offense could escape the death penalty if
he could read from the Bible. Though perhaps "reading" goes too far. As Lawrence Friedman has
discussed, defendants were always called upon to read the same verse, Psalm 51, which meant a
savvy but illiterate defendant had only to memorize the verse. Since it saved one from the gallows,
the verse came to be called the "neck verse." LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
IN AMERICAN HISTORY 43 (1993).
42. As I have discussed elsewhere, by "white-letter law," I am referring to societal and
normative laws that stand side-by-side and often undergird black letter law but, as if inscribed in
white ink on white paper, remain invisible to the naked eye. See I. Bennett Capers, The Trial of
Bigger Thomas: Race, Gender and Trespass, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 7-8 (2006).
43. Perhaps the only known prosecution is that of Margaret Douglass, a poor white seamstress
in Virginia who was sentenced to a month's imprisonment for teaching slaves to read. PHILIP S.
FONER & JOSEPHINE F. PACHECO, THREE WHO DARED: PRUDENCE CRANDALL, MARGARET
DOUGLASS, MYRTILLA MINER-CHAMPIONS OF ANTEBELLUM BLACK EDUCATION 57 (1984).
Other violations were handled extra-judicially. In 1835, in Charleston, South Carolina, for example,
a mob of "respectable men" gathered to lynch a Catholic priest and demolish the school for slaves
he had begun. The priest reluctantly agreed to discontinue the school. JANET DUITSMAN
CORNELIUS, "WHEN I CAN READ MY TITLE CLEAR": LITERACY, SLAVERY, AND RELIGION IN THE
ANTEBELLUM SOUTH 43-44 (1991).
44. 1 know of no better discussion of this than that of Judge Ruffin in State v. Mann, 13 N.C.
263 (1829), in which the North Carolina Supreme Court held that battery on a slave was not an
indictable offense:
The power of the master must be absolute, to render the submission of the slave
perfect.... We cannot allow the right of the master to be brought into discussion in the
Courts of Justice. The slave, to remain a slave, must be made sensible, that there is no
appeal from his master; that his power is in no instance, usurped; but is conferred by the
laws of man at least, if not by the law of God.
Id. at 266-67.
45. Janet Cornelius, "We Slipped and Learned to Read:" Slave Accounts of the Literary
Process, 1830-1865, 44 PHYLON 171, 174 (1983).
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read.46 And Oliver Perry, upon discovering that his slave Nancy had
learned to read, "made her pull off naked, whipped her and den slapped
hot irons to her all over. 4 7 More often, the punishment of choice was
amputation. Perhaps because amputation was permanent-a constant
reminder. What a utilitarian might call a general deterrent: A "sign for
de res uv 'em.
It should come as little surprise, then, that the topos of reading
appears repeatedly in African-American literature. In Narrative of the
Life of Frederick Douglass, as just one example, Douglass recounts
overhearing his master warn:
[I]t was unlawful, as well as unsafe, to teach a slave to read .... "If
you give a nigger an inch, he will take an ell. A nigger should know
nothing but to obey his master-to do as he is told to do.... [I]f you
teach [a] nigger ... how to read, there would be no keeping him. It
would forever unfit him to be a slave. He would at once become
unmanageable, and of no value to his master ..... 49
This overheard warning, however, spurs Douglass to master
literacy, to in fact become "unfit... to be a slave." He remarks to the
reader: "I now understood what had been to me a most perplexing
difficulty-to wit, the white man's power to enslave the black man. It
was a grand achievement, and I prized it highly. From that moment, I
understood the pathway from slavery to freedom., 50 Douglass concludes
by echoing his master's words-through the device of chiasmus-to
subvert them: "Mistress, in teaching me the alphabet, had given me the
inch, and no precaution could prevent me from taking the ell.",51
Reading, then, was especially crucial for blacks. After all, for
slaves, reading could mean the difference between servitude and
freedom. But this is my point. It was more than just reading that
mattered. It was reading critically. It was reading the Bible to see that it
contained not only the story of Ham, which whites invoked to induce
obedience and subservience, but also the story of the Deliverance of the
Children of Israel from Egypt, which, read critically and read black,
46. CORNELIUS, supra note 43, at 66.
47. Cornelius, supra note 45, at 174.
48. Id.
49. FREDERICK DOUGLASS, NARRATIVE OF THE LIFE OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS, AN
AMERICAN SLAVE (1845), reprinted in THE CLASSIC SLAVE NARRATIVES 243, 274 (Henry Louis
Gates, Jr. ed., 1987).
50. Id. at 275.
51. Id. at 277. Other examples exploring the link between literacy and freedom abound:
Harriet Jacobs's Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl, Richard Wright's Black Boy, Toni Morrison's
Beloved, Sapphire's Push, and Edward P. Jones's The Known World are just a few.
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could be read as authorizing revolt. 52, It was reading for the lapses in
logic, the inconsistencies, the self-delusions, the self-interests, the coded
language, the moments of blindness, the moments of sight, and the
policing, sometimes stated, more often not, of race. This was not limited
to written texts, but also oral texts, visual texts, and bodily texts. As a
practice, as a means of survival, it required a reading through and
around, a reading of both the said and the unsaid. It is the kind of
reading in which Sethe in Toni Morrison's Beloved engages when she
recalls the teachings of Schoolteacher and says, "No. Oh, no." It was a
reading that, to borrow from the black vernacular, involved "ciphering."
I am proposing that we-and by we, I am not referring only to
those of us who do law and literature, I am referring to all of us who do
law-I am proposing that we add to the way we read. And I know that
by marking this addition with race, I am suggesting a terrain fraught
with history and recriminations, a terrain that is not easily traversed,
which may be impossible to navigate. But given the life and death risks
blacks took to read, to read critically, the risks here are relatively minor.
Especially since the riches to obtain from unmasking language,
unmasking the law, are manifold.
II. CONCLUSION: THE CONSTITUTION READ BACK, READ BLACK
Thinking this through, it occurs to me that reading black is not only
critical, not only oppositional, but on other levels, at other frequencies, it
can also be generous and visionary. Consider again Frederick Douglass,
who rose from slavery to become a public intellectual-a leader in the
abolitionist movement. In 1857, he delivered a speech before the
American Anti-Slavery Society in New York. What was his topic? Dred
Scott v. Sandford.3 This former slave, once denied access to literacy,
read this opinion in which Justice Taney concluded that blacks, whether
slave or free, were not citizens within the meaning of the Constitution,
and prophetically claimed that the decision, "monstrous as it appears,"
could not stand. 54 How did Douglass reach this conclusion? By re-
52. For example, Denmark Vesey, who organized a slave revolt in South Carolina, invited
slaves to challenge white preachers about key Bible verses, and read from the Bible "where God
commanded, that all should be cut off, both men, women, and children," to rally other slaves to
rebel. Nat Turner, who lead a slave revolt in Virginia, used his ability to read from the Old
Testament to advocate seeking retribution against slave-holding families. CORNELIUS, supra note
43, at 30-32.
53. 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
54. Frederick Douglass, The Dred Scott Decision, Speech before the American Anti-Slavery
Society, (May 11, 1857), in 2 THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS: PRE-CIVIL WAR
DECADE 1850-1860, at 407, 412 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1950).
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reading the Constitution, by re-reading the Declaration of Independence.
I repeat portions of his speech below:
Now let us approach the Constitution from the standpoint thus
indicated, and instead of finding in it a warrant for the stupendous
system of robbery, comprehended in the term slavery, we shall find it
strongly against the system.
"We, the people"-not we, the white people-not we, the citizens,
or the legal voters-not we, the privileged class, and excluding all
other classes but we, the people; not we, the horses and cattle, but we
the people-the men and women, the human inhabitants of the United
States, do ordain and establish this Constitution, &c.
I ask, then, any man to read the Constitution, and tell me where, if
he can, in what particular that instrument affords the slightest sanction
of slavery?
Where will he find a guarantee for slavery? Will he find it in the
declaration that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law? Will he find it in the declaration that the
Constitution was established to secure the blessing of liberty? Will he
find it in the right of the people to be secure in their persons and
papers, and houses, and effects? Will he find it in the clause
prohibiting the enactment by any State of a bill of attainder?
Thus the very essence of the whole slave code is in open violation
of a fundamental provision of the Constitution, and is in open and
flagrant violation of all the objects set forth in the Constitution.
As a man, an American, a citizen, a colored man of both Anglo-
Saxon and African descent, I denounce this representation as a most
scandalous and devilish perversion of the Constitution, and a brazen
misstatement of the facts of history.
5 5
Douglass, in refuting the Dred Scott decision, in reading back the
Constitution, read black. We are all the beneficiaries of his vision.
55. ld.at418-20,421.
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